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 Summary
Research into the history of wartime 
collaborators and the post-war retaliation 
process has raised several issues. 
Th e fi rst issue is the great diff eren-
ce between western and eastern Europe. 
Numerous studies have confi rmed that 
there were also “two post-war periods” 
However,  there was not only the diff eren-
ce between West and East, there were also 
signifi cant diff erences among the states in 
each of these two parts. A brief overview 
has shown that Croatia and Yugoslavia 
were particularly fi erce in settling scores 
with collaborators, as well as with all gro-
ups declared “national enemies”. 
Th e second issue is that individu-
als were less relevant in times when politics calculated in great numbers. 
However, it can be said that there were diff erences among the states in their 
attempts to individualize the process of punishing collaborators (primarily, 
but not exclusively, in the West). Th ese states tried to validate their legitimacy 
by emphasizing the diff erences between them and the Nazism/fascism that 
had been overthrown in the understanding of rights and justice. However, in 
states such as Yugoslavia, in which one totalitarian system was immediately 
replaced by another, such a distinction was not made. 
Th e third characteristic of the post-war retaliation process was the crucial 
infl uence of politics. In all the European states, eastern or western, politics 
decided on the intensity, the extent and duration of retribution, based on the 
strategy of how to build a future. 
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In states which had chosen the “victim” strategy (such as Italy and Au-
stria) or the “resistance movement” (for example France), either there was 
hardly any settling of scores with the collaborators or else the process lasted 
for a short period of time and was restricted in extent. However, states enga-
ged in the establishment of a new revolutionary order (Yugoslavia being one 
of them) built their legitimacy on black-and-white images of themselves and 
the enemy. Th e “enemy” comprised not only the collaborators, but also the 
enemies of the revolution, hence these states carried out a “cleansing” process 
to an incomparably greater extent. Aft er the war this “ongoing revolution” 
needed to demonize the defeated totalitarianism for years, even decades. 
Th e trial of Živan Kuveždić was just one of hundreds of thousands in post-
war Europe, and in view of the fact that he was a government offi  cial, the 
trial can be compared to hundreds of trials in which members of the state 
leadership of the collaborationist regime were brought to trial. Aside from 
this typical similarity, almost no other similarities can be found among these 
trials. Th e outcome of the trials was, however, dependent on the location of 
the trial and according to this, Kuveždić would, for the same allegations, have 
been diff erently punished in each of the European states. Th ough historians 
are extremely unwilling to make assumptions, on the basis of everything we 
know, Kuveždić’s trial can however, to a certain degree, be put in the context 
of retribution in other European states. As a minister without portfolio, in 
fact as a local supporter of members of the resistance movement, in many 
other states he would have been acquitted of all charges; in some of them he 
would have been imprisoned, either for a short time or the imprisonment wo-
uld have been diminished by general pardons. He would perhaps have got the 
death penalty in Bulgaria in January 1945 or in the USSR (concerning  which 
there is still no research to be found for a more reliable comparison).
Before the war Kuveždić was active in the Croatian Peasant Party, not 
only as a politician but as the initiator enforcing numerous useful actions whi-
ch provided concrete benefi ts for his home village Ilača and the Šid district 
(economic associations and campaigns, the establishment of local cultural in-
stitutions and associations and others).
Immediately aft er the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia, 
he joined the Ustasha regime. It was a voluntary act, but nevertheless was 
not due to any ideological affi  liation to the Ustasha movement (as claimed by 
the prosecution during the trial), and initially not even with the objective of 
protecting the people in his district (as claimed by Kuveždić in his defence). 
We assume that, at least in the fi rst few days, this was a logical continuation 
of his active role in his home district, and a positive attitude toward the esta-
blishment of the state that would have ensured that Syrmia would permanen-
tly belong to Croatia (aft er the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had attempted to use 
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administrative measures to split it off ). His later membership in the Ustasha 
regime, even in the political leadership, was characterized by a more complex 
motivation (a mixture of the need to protect the people he felt responsible 
for and of fear) and by more complex activities (his membership in the go-
vernment leadership, i.e. in the Parliament in the government of the NDH, 
the Independent State of Croatia, on the one hand and on the other hand his 
opposition to the Ustashas on the local level). Th e Ustasha regime became 
a millstone for him with no way out: he did not want ministerial duty (he 
even feared it); he did not approve of any of the occurrences at the end of the 
war and aft er 1943 he carried out only formal duties. Even his escape from 
Croatia was not of his own will. He did not even escape from the Allied refu-
gee camps, even though he had the chance. However, lacking the necessary 
education, at the age of 60 and in poor health, he could hardly start a new life 
anywhere, hence he gave in to the inevitable. 
In August 1948 he was handed over to the new Communist authorities. 
Because the new government’s documents on the trial are preserved, we can 
determine how individuals were treated and we can surmise what had de-
termined the behaviour of individuals of the defeated Ustasha regime. From 
Kuveždić’s statements we experience a person, an individual confused by the 
great events that had caused him to lose his sense of direction. What was left , 
if we exclude his interpretation of many things in his own favour, was his sin-
cere notion that the good things he had done, namely saving concrete people, 
was more signifi cant than the fact that together with other, more infl uential 
and more capable people than himself, he had authorized legal regulations 
on the basis of which abstract people were aff ected. His fi rst impression of 
not being guilty and his eventual confession (“now I realize”) that his con-
sent to the legal regulations had had bad consequences, fi lled him with initial 
optimism that his case would have a positive ending in his favour. However, 
judicial system was set up in such a way as to ensure the conviction of those 
meant to be convicted. Starting with the laws, which provided comprehensive 
but unspecifi c defi nitions of war crimes providing for the most severe puni-
shment, through to the legal interpretation given by the District Court, where 
he was convicted, all this led to the most severe verdict. However, exactly this 
legal vagueness as well as the free interpretation of facts used by both the 
prosecutors and judges, tell that the judicial system was not in charge of the 
decision-making process on guilt and punishment. 
Politics still made the decisions and imposed the death penalty on Ku-
veždić. Th ere was nothing new in his not having deserved the most severe 
punishment by his personal guilt. Perhaps the most diffi  cult thing about this 
trial was the fact that for the new government he was even rather insignifi cant. 
Th ey clearly estimated that neither was Kuveždić of any particular use nor 
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could a condign punishment be imposed because the trial remained in the 
shade of other events. However, although he was not exploited in the media, 
which would at least have indicated political pragmatism, they did not even 
try to give him a fair trial nor did they attempt to present themselves in a more 
human light by pardoning him. Eventually, the new regime must be perceived 
as it was, as a system that was repressive enough still to need a “demonic” 
opponent as a counterbalance and as an excuse. 
